This is a great question, and highlights a common misunderstanding in the investment community.
Pix and UPI simultaneously compress dLocal's headline take-rate (as a percentage of volume) while expanding its net margins and strengthening its competitive moat.
As such, both statements are true, but they apply to entirely different layers of the financial stack.
Allow me to explain.
If you evaluate the business strictly on its blended take-rate (Revenue / Total Payment Volume), instant-payment rails do compress the top line relative to traditional international card rails. Traditional developed economy card rails (VISA, Mastercard, AMEX, etc) are notoriously expensive. The cost to a global merchant can easily range from 2% to 4%+. dLocal clips a significant piece of this spread.
Pix and UPI were architected by central banks specifically to bypass legacy card infrastructure. They are account-to-account (A2A) transfers operating with near-zero interchange. Because the underlying cost of moving money via Pix or UPI is incredibly low, global merchants expect, and negotiate, much lower processing fees.
As massive merchants (e.g., streaming giants, global SaaS, e-commerce marketplaces) scale their volume through dLocal and incentivize users to migrate from cards to Pix/UPI, the blended take-rate naturally trends downward.
But this is an impact tthe "TOP Line" numbers on the income statement.
Now focus your attention on the "BOTTOM Line".
When a consumer pays via a traditional credit card, a massive chunk of the fee dLocal collects is immediately passed through to Visa, Mastercard, and the issuing bank (interchange fees). This often appears as COGS on the income statement. In stark contrast, when a consumer pays via UPI or Pix, those middle-man fees are eliminated, the pass-through cost is fractions of a penny and dLocal retains a much cleaner, higher-margin slice of the pie.
The real monetization magic for dLocal doesn’t happen on the domestic collection itself; it happens at the cross-border intersection.
If a merchant only needed local-to-local processing (e.g., a Brazilian company collecting Pix from a Brazilian consumer), local banks and domestic gateways would commoditize the pricing instantly. However, dLocal’s core clients are global merchants (like Google, Spotify, or Nike) who need to collect Pix in Brazilian Real or UPI in Indian Rupees and legally, efficiently expatriate those funds back to the US or Europe in USD or EUR.
dLocal extracts its most defensive, high-margin revenue from this FX management, local regulatory compliance, and cross-border settlement.
Hi James — great article. I’ve been following dLocal for a while and wanted your take on something. The payments space has sold off on fears around stablecoins, AI agents, and software becoming cheaper to build. Do you think any of those trends materially impact dLocal? Pedro seems to be leaning into them, but one could argue they increase long-term risk—especially stablecoins, since EM markets without established rails could adopt them faster.
Also, as EM markets mature, they may need fewer “bridge” solutions over time. How do you think about that risk? Would love your perspective.
Viewing stablecoins as a structural threat misunderstands the core friction dLocal solves. In reality, stablecoins are a technological optimization tool for dLocal’s business model rather than a replacement for it.
Crucially, the end-consumers in emerging markets do not have a wallet full of stablecoins; they have cash, a local debit card (like Elo in Brazil), or a domestic instant-payment account (like Pix or India's UPI).
On the other side, do global merchants like Netflix or Amazon want to hold Tether (USDT) or USD Coin (USDC) on their balance sheets? Do they want to navigate the operational security of managing private crypto keys? Probably not. Enterprise merchants optimize for simplicity, predictability, and the elimination of administrative overhead.
dLocal solves these problems by bridging between the two groups.
The hardest part of cross-border emerging market payments is navigating the legal, tax, and capital control frameworks of highly protective jurisdictions (e.g., Nigeria, Argentina, Brazil).
Moving value out via stablecoins without proper regulatory clearance constitutes sanctions evasion or capital flight, so stablecoins should not be considered a silver bullet solution. dLocal builds this compliance directly into its API. A pure crypto protocol cannot natively handle local tax compliance and state-level capital constraints.
dLocal operates as a heavily licensed, locally regulated entity in every market it enters. It handles the local tax withholding, Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) checks. Using stablecoin doesn't answer these problems.
In short, dLocal is not a payment rail itself that can be disrupted by a new payment rail. Instead think about dLocal as a service that removes the pain by providing the infrastructure that connects 1,000+ deeply fragmented local payment methods across more than 60 emerging markets. Stablecoins are just another payment method in the dLocal toolbox which they have already deployed via their Stablecoin Full product suite.
Then it is important to understand that a major component of dLocal's monetization and defensibility is its sophisticated cross-border treasury management. When a merchant collects a vast sum of volatile local fiat currency across dozens of distinct geographies, dLocal manages the underlying FX risk, pools the liquidity, and handles the repatriation optimization.
Stablecoins actually improve dLocal's internal economics here. By using stablecoins as a real-time, 24/7 liquidity layer for their own internal treasury operations, dLocal can reduce its dependence on legacy intermediary SWIFT networks, compress settlement times from days to minutes, and dramatically lower its own operational working capital requirements. It shifts stablecoins from a competitor to a margin-enhancer.
dLocal has delivered another exceptionally strong quarter, and the headline number is almost difficult to ignore.
Total payment volume reached $17.7 billion, up 92% year-on-year and 80% in constant currency. That was the seventh consecutive quarter in which TPV growth exceeded 50%, with the last three quarters growing at 70% or more.
Revenue increased 56% to $400 million, while gross profit reached a record $127 million, up 29%. Net income increased 28% to $55 million. But perhaps the most interesting number is that dLocal processed more payment volume in the second quarter than it processed during the whole of 2023.
This is no longer a small payments platform demonstrating promising growth. It is beginning to operate at meaningful scale.
What makes the growth particularly attractive is the depth of the customer relationships. dLocal now has more than 760 global merchants using its platform across more than 60 emerging markets, and net revenue retention was 153% for the quarter, the fifth consecutive quarter above 140%. Its TPV retention rate was even more striking at 188%. In other words, growth is not simply coming from signing new customers.
Existing customers are expanding into more countries, adding payment methods and increasing their volumes. Share of wallet increased by two percentage points during the first half to the low teens, while dLocal estimates that it still has only a low-single-digit share of emerging-market digital payments. That is the interesting part of the story. The company appears to have a relatively small position in a very large and fragmented market, while its existing customers are increasingly giving it more of their business.
There is also an important shift happening in the composition of the business. Pay-ins exceeded $13 billion for the first time, up 110%, while local-to-local payments increased 141% to $10.8 billion. The latter is particularly interesting because it demonstrates that dLocal is moving beyond simply facilitating cross-border payments and becoming part of the domestic payment infrastructure within emerging markets.
Latin America remains the engine, generating 80% of gross profit, with Brazil and Argentina showing particularly strong momentum. At the same time, Africa and Asia were weaker because of lower contributions from higher-FX-spread markets such as Mozambique and Vietnam, alongside a one-off cost increase in Nigeria. This is an important reminder that dLocal's opportunity is enormous, but it operates in markets where currencies, regulation and economics can change very quickly.
The one area that deserves watching is the relationship between volume growth and margins. Gross profit increased 29%, considerably slower than the 92% increase in TPV, and gross margin fell to 32% from 39% a year ago. Gross profit per dollar of TPV also declined, reflecting the greater contribution from local-to-local payments, the ramp-up of very large merchants and the natural economics of scaling established customers across new products, payment methods and countries.
At the same time, operating expenses increased 46%, partly because of investments made during 2025, higher salaries and front-loaded marketing spending around the World Cup. Yet there is a positive counterpoint: operating profit increased 15% to $64 million and the operating-profit-to-gross-profit ratio improved six percentage points sequentially to 50%.
Management expects further operating leverage in the second half as automation and AI investments begin to bear fruit and the elevated first-half spending rolls off.
The cash generation and guidance therefore make the results even more interesting. Adjusted free cash flow was $68.5 million in the quarter, up 41%, representing 125% of net income, while corporate cash stood at $369 million within total cash of $795 million.
dLocal also repurchased 6.9 million shares for $86 million under its $300 million buyback programme.
Management has raised its 2026 TPV growth guidance from 50–60% to 60–70% and gross-profit growth from 22.5–27.5% to 25–30%, while maintaining operating-profit growth guidance of 27.5–32.5%.
The investment case, is still very much in tact. The combination of a low market share, exceptionally high customer retention, increasing share of wallet and a rapidly scaling payments platform creates a rather powerful compounding opportunity. The emerging-market complexity that makes the business difficult to replicate is also, ironically, what creates the moat.
Thank you for this article. I had a couple of question regarding the growth from new vs existing merchants and on the gross profit margin.
I see that the growth from existing merchants is significantly higher than from new merchants: 112M vs 7M in Q1 2026. How should we read this? my interpretation is that new merchants start with a small volume routed through dLocal and begin to scale slowly. If I am correct then, this growth from existing merchants means that there is visibility of growth in the short-medium term, and from new merchants it provides visibility on a longer term, although it does not scale linearly due to slow ramp up.
On gross profit margins, I see that it has fallen from 53% back in 2021 to 37% in 2025. Looking further down the income statement, I see quite a moderation in R&D, marketing and SG&A cost increase in 2025 compared to previous years, which validates the assumption that margins are depressed from ongoing investments into the platform. However, the CoS has grown roughly proportional to TPV growth, and the main contributor to CoS is procesing costs, while revenue has increased more slowly, as a result of lower take rates. Correct me if I am wrong, but I expect to see that economies of scale will play out a more important role further down the income statement, and not as much in the gross margin itself for all of the reasons you mentioned like the shift in mix to larger merchants. Therefore, the improvement will be quite modest. However, the way you put it by saying that profit margins were in the mid 30s and now in the mid 10s makes it seem like the stock would at least double on the same multiple.
Sorry for the delay in responding, it's been a busy week.
Your interpretation is correct.
As with all payments companies, they win a merchant and then aim for a larger share of wallet over time as they demonstrate that they are able to add value.
There has been investment for growth that pressures margins, but like you say, the upside potential is significant. The thesis is playing our faster than I had anticipated, with the stock up significantly since I published, but with a long way further to go (IMHO).
Importantly, dLocal generally benefits from negative working capital dynamics due to its customer float, and this is a key feature of its payment platform economics.
dLocal receives cash from merchants before paying out to local beneficiaries. This generates operating cash flow rather than consuming it.
Working capital swings do occur, but are temporary and cyclical, tied to TPV growth and emerging-market FX/regulatory volatility.
When TPV accelerates (>50% growth), pre-funding requirements increase temporarily, creating cash outflows that revert as the cycle normalizes. A nice problem to have!
dLocal's working capital dynamics are also shaped by the fact that it must frequently pre-fund local payout accounts to ensure instant settlement for merchants. This creates temporary working capital outflows that can distort quarterly cash flow, though these swings typically revert over time.
There are other factors to consider. Recent FX regulatory changes in Argentina forced structuring adjustments to expatriate flows, seen in Q1 2026 numbers where free cash flow was negatively affected.
Despite quarterly distortions, dLocal maintains a fortress cash balance sheet and generates consistent free cash flow over longer periods, with good double digit FCF margins.
dLocal (Nasdaq: DLO) announced an expansion of its BNPL Fuse product, which is essentially an infrastructure platform that lets global merchants offer buy now, pay later services across emerging markets. The core problem it solves is structural: in places like South Africa and Latin America, the vast majority of consumers don't have credit cards, and without flexible payment options, up to two-thirds of potential buyers simply abandon their carts. Fuse addresses this by giving merchants a single API to connect with multiple local BNPL providers, handling all the licensing, compliance, and settlement in each market.
The new version adds a few key performance-boosting features. There's now an intelligent screening layer that checks buyer eligibility before checkout and enriches data to improve approval rates. It also includes centralized refund management, so merchants can apply one consistent refund policy across all providers. For subscription businesses, there's a clever update: they can now get a full annual contract financed upfront through BNPL, replacing twelve monthly billing events and eliminating the risk of involuntary customer churn.
The early results are quite compelling. In South Africa, BNPL ticket sizes run 60-330% higher than card transactions, and the majority of those BNPL buyers had no prior card transaction with the same merchant. This suggests it's driving truly incremental revenue. One merchant saw a 144% increase in conversion after Fuse resolved a multi-login friction point on Android devices. Overall, BNPL Fuse has been growing about 20% month-over-month, reaching nearly $19 million in processed volume this past March. It's shifting from being just an access solution to a genuine performance channel.
25 likes? Are you kidding me? Great piece.
One topic confused me:
In the competition/moat section, regarding UPI & PIX, you said:
"dLocal earns higher margins on these alternative payment methods (APMs) than on standard card rails".
But in the Numbers section you said:
"‘pay-ins’ via local credit cards generate premium take-rates, domestic instant-payment rails (Pix/UPI) compress the blended take-rate"
How are those not contradictory? Are UPI & PIX high or low margin for DLO?
This is a great question, and highlights a common misunderstanding in the investment community.
Pix and UPI simultaneously compress dLocal's headline take-rate (as a percentage of volume) while expanding its net margins and strengthening its competitive moat.
As such, both statements are true, but they apply to entirely different layers of the financial stack.
Allow me to explain.
If you evaluate the business strictly on its blended take-rate (Revenue / Total Payment Volume), instant-payment rails do compress the top line relative to traditional international card rails. Traditional developed economy card rails (VISA, Mastercard, AMEX, etc) are notoriously expensive. The cost to a global merchant can easily range from 2% to 4%+. dLocal clips a significant piece of this spread.
Pix and UPI were architected by central banks specifically to bypass legacy card infrastructure. They are account-to-account (A2A) transfers operating with near-zero interchange. Because the underlying cost of moving money via Pix or UPI is incredibly low, global merchants expect, and negotiate, much lower processing fees.
As massive merchants (e.g., streaming giants, global SaaS, e-commerce marketplaces) scale their volume through dLocal and incentivize users to migrate from cards to Pix/UPI, the blended take-rate naturally trends downward.
But this is an impact tthe "TOP Line" numbers on the income statement.
Now focus your attention on the "BOTTOM Line".
When a consumer pays via a traditional credit card, a massive chunk of the fee dLocal collects is immediately passed through to Visa, Mastercard, and the issuing bank (interchange fees). This often appears as COGS on the income statement. In stark contrast, when a consumer pays via UPI or Pix, those middle-man fees are eliminated, the pass-through cost is fractions of a penny and dLocal retains a much cleaner, higher-margin slice of the pie.
The real monetization magic for dLocal doesn’t happen on the domestic collection itself; it happens at the cross-border intersection.
If a merchant only needed local-to-local processing (e.g., a Brazilian company collecting Pix from a Brazilian consumer), local banks and domestic gateways would commoditize the pricing instantly. However, dLocal’s core clients are global merchants (like Google, Spotify, or Nike) who need to collect Pix in Brazilian Real or UPI in Indian Rupees and legally, efficiently expatriate those funds back to the US or Europe in USD or EUR.
dLocal extracts its most defensive, high-margin revenue from this FX management, local regulatory compliance, and cross-border settlement.
Fantastic answer, thank you.
Hi James — great article. I’ve been following dLocal for a while and wanted your take on something. The payments space has sold off on fears around stablecoins, AI agents, and software becoming cheaper to build. Do you think any of those trends materially impact dLocal? Pedro seems to be leaning into them, but one could argue they increase long-term risk—especially stablecoins, since EM markets without established rails could adopt them faster.
Also, as EM markets mature, they may need fewer “bridge” solutions over time. How do you think about that risk? Would love your perspective.
Stablecoins and dLocal: 'Friend or Foe?'
Viewing stablecoins as a structural threat misunderstands the core friction dLocal solves. In reality, stablecoins are a technological optimization tool for dLocal’s business model rather than a replacement for it.
Crucially, the end-consumers in emerging markets do not have a wallet full of stablecoins; they have cash, a local debit card (like Elo in Brazil), or a domestic instant-payment account (like Pix or India's UPI).
On the other side, do global merchants like Netflix or Amazon want to hold Tether (USDT) or USD Coin (USDC) on their balance sheets? Do they want to navigate the operational security of managing private crypto keys? Probably not. Enterprise merchants optimize for simplicity, predictability, and the elimination of administrative overhead.
dLocal solves these problems by bridging between the two groups.
The hardest part of cross-border emerging market payments is navigating the legal, tax, and capital control frameworks of highly protective jurisdictions (e.g., Nigeria, Argentina, Brazil).
Moving value out via stablecoins without proper regulatory clearance constitutes sanctions evasion or capital flight, so stablecoins should not be considered a silver bullet solution. dLocal builds this compliance directly into its API. A pure crypto protocol cannot natively handle local tax compliance and state-level capital constraints.
dLocal operates as a heavily licensed, locally regulated entity in every market it enters. It handles the local tax withholding, Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) checks. Using stablecoin doesn't answer these problems.
In short, dLocal is not a payment rail itself that can be disrupted by a new payment rail. Instead think about dLocal as a service that removes the pain by providing the infrastructure that connects 1,000+ deeply fragmented local payment methods across more than 60 emerging markets. Stablecoins are just another payment method in the dLocal toolbox which they have already deployed via their Stablecoin Full product suite.
Then it is important to understand that a major component of dLocal's monetization and defensibility is its sophisticated cross-border treasury management. When a merchant collects a vast sum of volatile local fiat currency across dozens of distinct geographies, dLocal manages the underlying FX risk, pools the liquidity, and handles the repatriation optimization.
Stablecoins actually improve dLocal's internal economics here. By using stablecoins as a real-time, 24/7 liquidity layer for their own internal treasury operations, dLocal can reduce its dependence on legacy intermediary SWIFT networks, compress settlement times from days to minutes, and dramatically lower its own operational working capital requirements. It shifts stablecoins from a competitor to a margin-enhancer.
Thanks! This is very useful
dLocal has delivered another exceptionally strong quarter, and the headline number is almost difficult to ignore.
Total payment volume reached $17.7 billion, up 92% year-on-year and 80% in constant currency. That was the seventh consecutive quarter in which TPV growth exceeded 50%, with the last three quarters growing at 70% or more.
Revenue increased 56% to $400 million, while gross profit reached a record $127 million, up 29%. Net income increased 28% to $55 million. But perhaps the most interesting number is that dLocal processed more payment volume in the second quarter than it processed during the whole of 2023.
This is no longer a small payments platform demonstrating promising growth. It is beginning to operate at meaningful scale.
What makes the growth particularly attractive is the depth of the customer relationships. dLocal now has more than 760 global merchants using its platform across more than 60 emerging markets, and net revenue retention was 153% for the quarter, the fifth consecutive quarter above 140%. Its TPV retention rate was even more striking at 188%. In other words, growth is not simply coming from signing new customers.
Existing customers are expanding into more countries, adding payment methods and increasing their volumes. Share of wallet increased by two percentage points during the first half to the low teens, while dLocal estimates that it still has only a low-single-digit share of emerging-market digital payments. That is the interesting part of the story. The company appears to have a relatively small position in a very large and fragmented market, while its existing customers are increasingly giving it more of their business.
There is also an important shift happening in the composition of the business. Pay-ins exceeded $13 billion for the first time, up 110%, while local-to-local payments increased 141% to $10.8 billion. The latter is particularly interesting because it demonstrates that dLocal is moving beyond simply facilitating cross-border payments and becoming part of the domestic payment infrastructure within emerging markets.
Latin America remains the engine, generating 80% of gross profit, with Brazil and Argentina showing particularly strong momentum. At the same time, Africa and Asia were weaker because of lower contributions from higher-FX-spread markets such as Mozambique and Vietnam, alongside a one-off cost increase in Nigeria. This is an important reminder that dLocal's opportunity is enormous, but it operates in markets where currencies, regulation and economics can change very quickly.
The one area that deserves watching is the relationship between volume growth and margins. Gross profit increased 29%, considerably slower than the 92% increase in TPV, and gross margin fell to 32% from 39% a year ago. Gross profit per dollar of TPV also declined, reflecting the greater contribution from local-to-local payments, the ramp-up of very large merchants and the natural economics of scaling established customers across new products, payment methods and countries.
At the same time, operating expenses increased 46%, partly because of investments made during 2025, higher salaries and front-loaded marketing spending around the World Cup. Yet there is a positive counterpoint: operating profit increased 15% to $64 million and the operating-profit-to-gross-profit ratio improved six percentage points sequentially to 50%.
Management expects further operating leverage in the second half as automation and AI investments begin to bear fruit and the elevated first-half spending rolls off.
The cash generation and guidance therefore make the results even more interesting. Adjusted free cash flow was $68.5 million in the quarter, up 41%, representing 125% of net income, while corporate cash stood at $369 million within total cash of $795 million.
dLocal also repurchased 6.9 million shares for $86 million under its $300 million buyback programme.
Management has raised its 2026 TPV growth guidance from 50–60% to 60–70% and gross-profit growth from 22.5–27.5% to 25–30%, while maintaining operating-profit growth guidance of 27.5–32.5%.
The investment case, is still very much in tact. The combination of a low market share, exceptionally high customer retention, increasing share of wallet and a rapidly scaling payments platform creates a rather powerful compounding opportunity. The emerging-market complexity that makes the business difficult to replicate is also, ironically, what creates the moat.
dLocal is surging higher today (+10%) after a UBS upgrade with a $20 price target
This follows a series of positive news flows in recent weeks:
- strong Q4 2025 with revenue coming in over 10% higher than forecasts
- upbeat 2026 guidance for growth in total payment volume, gross profit, and operating profit
- a US$300.00 million share buyback and new dividend signalling confidence in cash generation
- officially added to the Russell 2000 and 3000 Indexes
Thank you for this article. I had a couple of question regarding the growth from new vs existing merchants and on the gross profit margin.
I see that the growth from existing merchants is significantly higher than from new merchants: 112M vs 7M in Q1 2026. How should we read this? my interpretation is that new merchants start with a small volume routed through dLocal and begin to scale slowly. If I am correct then, this growth from existing merchants means that there is visibility of growth in the short-medium term, and from new merchants it provides visibility on a longer term, although it does not scale linearly due to slow ramp up.
On gross profit margins, I see that it has fallen from 53% back in 2021 to 37% in 2025. Looking further down the income statement, I see quite a moderation in R&D, marketing and SG&A cost increase in 2025 compared to previous years, which validates the assumption that margins are depressed from ongoing investments into the platform. However, the CoS has grown roughly proportional to TPV growth, and the main contributor to CoS is procesing costs, while revenue has increased more slowly, as a result of lower take rates. Correct me if I am wrong, but I expect to see that economies of scale will play out a more important role further down the income statement, and not as much in the gross margin itself for all of the reasons you mentioned like the shift in mix to larger merchants. Therefore, the improvement will be quite modest. However, the way you put it by saying that profit margins were in the mid 30s and now in the mid 10s makes it seem like the stock would at least double on the same multiple.
Sorry for the delay in responding, it's been a busy week.
Your interpretation is correct.
As with all payments companies, they win a merchant and then aim for a larger share of wallet over time as they demonstrate that they are able to add value.
There has been investment for growth that pressures margins, but like you say, the upside potential is significant. The thesis is playing our faster than I had anticipated, with the stock up significantly since I published, but with a long way further to go (IMHO).
How do you think about Working Capital needs of this business? Currently and over time. Thanks.
Importantly, dLocal generally benefits from negative working capital dynamics due to its customer float, and this is a key feature of its payment platform economics.
dLocal receives cash from merchants before paying out to local beneficiaries. This generates operating cash flow rather than consuming it.
Working capital swings do occur, but are temporary and cyclical, tied to TPV growth and emerging-market FX/regulatory volatility.
When TPV accelerates (>50% growth), pre-funding requirements increase temporarily, creating cash outflows that revert as the cycle normalizes. A nice problem to have!
dLocal's working capital dynamics are also shaped by the fact that it must frequently pre-fund local payout accounts to ensure instant settlement for merchants. This creates temporary working capital outflows that can distort quarterly cash flow, though these swings typically revert over time.
There are other factors to consider. Recent FX regulatory changes in Argentina forced structuring adjustments to expatriate flows, seen in Q1 2026 numbers where free cash flow was negatively affected.
Despite quarterly distortions, dLocal maintains a fortress cash balance sheet and generates consistent free cash flow over longer periods, with good double digit FCF margins.
dLocal (Nasdaq: DLO) announced an expansion of its BNPL Fuse product, which is essentially an infrastructure platform that lets global merchants offer buy now, pay later services across emerging markets. The core problem it solves is structural: in places like South Africa and Latin America, the vast majority of consumers don't have credit cards, and without flexible payment options, up to two-thirds of potential buyers simply abandon their carts. Fuse addresses this by giving merchants a single API to connect with multiple local BNPL providers, handling all the licensing, compliance, and settlement in each market.
The new version adds a few key performance-boosting features. There's now an intelligent screening layer that checks buyer eligibility before checkout and enriches data to improve approval rates. It also includes centralized refund management, so merchants can apply one consistent refund policy across all providers. For subscription businesses, there's a clever update: they can now get a full annual contract financed upfront through BNPL, replacing twelve monthly billing events and eliminating the risk of involuntary customer churn.
The early results are quite compelling. In South Africa, BNPL ticket sizes run 60-330% higher than card transactions, and the majority of those BNPL buyers had no prior card transaction with the same merchant. This suggests it's driving truly incremental revenue. One merchant saw a 144% increase in conversion after Fuse resolved a multi-login friction point on Android devices. Overall, BNPL Fuse has been growing about 20% month-over-month, reaching nearly $19 million in processed volume this past March. It's shifting from being just an access solution to a genuine performance channel.
The best analysis of DLO that I have read.
Thank you